Showing posts with label Nasionalisme. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nasionalisme. Show all posts

Saturday, August 08, 2026


"Andreas Harsono is not well known to the public but he is very well known among a small network of human rights activists, dissident scholars, Indonesian journalists, and foreign correspondents. He is often the fixer behind their stories – unacknowledged, unassuming, unselfish. Now he has shown just what a superb chronicler he is in his own right."

Clinton Fernandes of University of New South Wales University
on Andreas Harsono's book Race, Islam and Power

Andreas Harsono meliput dampak dari tsunami 2014 di Aceh. Ombak raksasa tersebut membunuh lebih 100,000 orang dan mengakhiri perang selama tiga dekade antara Gerakan Acheh Merdeka dan Indonesia lewat perjanjian damai Helsinki pada Agustus 2015. ©Hotli Simanjuntak

Media dan Jurnalisme

Saya pernah bekerja sebagai wartawan The Jakarta Post, The Nation (Bangkok), The Star (Kuala Lumpur) dan majalah Pantau (Jakarta). Saya suka menulis soal jurnalisme. Bill Kovach, guru jurnalisme, mendidik saya buat menjadi wartawan ketika belajar di Universitas Harvard.


Saya menerbitkan dua antologi –Jurnalisme Sastrawi (2005) bersama Budi Setiyono dan “Agama” Saya Adalah Jurnalisme (2011)—serta beberapa laporan termasuk Prosecuting Political Aspiration: Indonesia’s Political Prisoners (2010), In Religion’s Name: Abuses Against Religious Minorities in Indonesia (2013) serta "I Wanted to Run Away": Abusive Dress Codes for Women and Girls in Indonesia (2021). Pada 2019, buku Race, Islam and Power terbit.

Sejak 2008, saya bekerja sebagai peneliti buat Human Rights Watch. Ia membuat saya banyak menulis soal diskriminasi terhadap minoritas agama di Indonesia: minoritas dalam Islam termasuk Ahmadiyah dan Syiah; minoritas non-Islam termasuk Protestan, Katholik, Buddha, Hindu dan Khong Hu Chu; minoritas agama kecil maupun agama baru macam Millah Abraham. 

Minoritas gender --termasuk perempuan serta LGBTIQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer)-- juga sering saya bahas. Saya juga banyak menulis minoritas etnik macam Aceh, Kalimantan, Jawa, Maluku, Timor serta Papua.

Perjalanan

Saya pernah jalan dari Sabang sampai Merauke, dari Miangas sampai Rote, lebih dari 80 lokasi, selama tiga tahun. Saya menulis tempat menarik. Saya juga sering menulis perjalanan di negeri jauh, dari Eropa sampai Amerika, praktis berbagai kota besar di Asia Tenggara. 

Cerita

Pengalaman hidup, dari kegembiraan sampai kesedihan, dari kawan sampai adik. Saya selalu tinggal di Pulau Jawa --Jember, Lawang, Malang, Salatiga, dan Jakarta-- namun pernah bermukim di Phnom Penh dan Cambridge, dekat Boston. Kedua anak saya lahir di Jakarta. Isteri saya, Sapariah Saturi, kelahiran Pontianak, pindah ke Jakarta buat bekerja. Mungkin kawan saya di luar Indonesia, paling banyak di New York sehingga saya sering berkunjung ke New York maupun kota-kota sekitarnya.



Friday, February 25, 2022

To Forgive

By Goenawan Mohamad
 
I don’t remember the exact date. But looking back now, I realize that it must have been at some time in February 1948. I was seven years old. The previous night, I had heard the adults talking about something they called a “truce.” I realize now that they must have been talking about the “Renville Agreement,” which was intended to bring to an end the armed conflict between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia.
 
Both sides knew that the truce could never really hold. But for one day at least, the atmosphere was peaceful. At the very least, there hadn’t been any shooting the previous night. 
 
There was a fleeting sense of relief. People were cheerful, but they was a strange sense of peace.
 
Dutch soldiers were still roaming the streets in open jeeps, holding their rifles. At the same time, the people of our small town had begun hanging red and white flags on the doors of their houses. People even felt sufficiently confident to gather together in an open field. I went there, with my mother. Nobody seemed to be afraid. At one point, the people broke out in song, singing Tujuh Belas Agustus (“On the 17th of August”) together. It was a new revolutionary song, and only a few were familiar with it. Even so, I saw one woman, a friend of my mother’s from her time in exile in Digul, singing at the top of her voice, tears in her eyes.
 
But in the end, it turned out that the day was not quite as peaceful as it had seemed at the beginning. 
 
When we got back from the celebration in the field in the late afternoon, our housekeeper, Sambyat, told us that some Dutch soldiers had stormed into the house, carrying guns. After removing the paper flags of the new Republic from our gate, a soldier had forced Sambyat to swallow two of them. Then they had left. 
 
In the evening, Mother told me that earlier in the afternoon, the Dutch soldiers had shot dead four young men in the rice fields. There hadn’t been any fighting. “They weren’t even partisans,” my mother said.
 
From that moment onwards, the word “truce” took on a completely different meaning in our household.
 
Almost a full century later, in 2022, the Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, issued a statement on behalf of his government. “On behalf of the Dutch government, I offer my most profound apologies to the people of Indonesia for the systematic violence perpetrated upon them by our country, a violence that until now has never been fully acknowledged,” he said.
 
I can understand why he made the apology, but I’m not sure that he was the right person to issue it. Rutte was born in 1967, a full twenty years after Van Mook, the acting Governor General of the Dutch East Indies, had attempted to destroy the design of the new Republic and conducted acts of military aggression against its people. I am not sure that Rutte has a good grasp of Indonesian history and its intricacy. He belongs to a generation raised years after Westerling, the notorious Dutch counter-insurgency officer, ordered the execution of hundreds of “terrorists” in Sulawesi without trial, and attempted a military coup against the Indonesian government.
 
I prefer to see Rutte’s apology not as  a conscientious policy, but rather a political act or, if you will, a proxy. It is a mea culpa without pathos. After all, his government has no part in the ugly chapter of the Dutch colonial history, and he could fairly say that our entangled histories were, like other histories, a “slaughtered bench”, to borrow Hegel’s dark metaphor; and who knows where the Schlachtbank exactly was.

We write history and stack up collective memories. But historiography has a fundamental flaw: it requires the use of words and names. It is based on an assumption that there is a common agreement regarding what these words and names mean: “Dutch” “Indonesianas,”, “violence.”
 
Historians string them together to create narratives and produce a meaning about the value of human freedom. They want to believe that the words they use will generate a consensus of signification. But language is tricky.
 
The word “Dutch” only means something if you compare it to something that is “non-Dutch” — and that is without limit. You’ll never be able to completely define what the words “Dutch” and “Indonesian” might mean. You can’t define a word by looking it up in the dictionary or in Wikipedia. Each word is perpetually elusive. Identities, names, and labels are always a process.
 
So I’m not saying anything new arguing that the word “Dutch” meant something different in the 1940s to what it means in 2020. The link between the government in The Hague today and Westerling — who, incidentally, tried to become an opera singer after retiring as a soldier — is entirely an abstraction.
 
A professor at Leiden University, who knew that the colonial regime sent my parents into an exile in Papua in the 1930s and executed my father in 1947, once asked me: “Do you still hate the Dutch?” 
 
“I don’t think so, ” I replied, somewhat taken aback. 
 
“I asked you because we Dutch still hate the Germans,” he replied.
 
The professor was a a very civil sort; it was atypical that he, speaking of Germans, used the word “hate”. But how could I assess the intensity of the pain, the humiliation, and the trauma living under Nazi’s repression?
 
“Our experiences are different,” I replied.
 
Experiences are always  personal and different. Each is shaped by a finite and transitory world. I do not believe that there is any such thing as a “collective memory” recording history without blemish. This is particularly true when it comes to what may be described as “extreme violence” in the past. Every time I hear people sitting down to judge what happened in the past, I hear one line of Chairil Anwar’s poetry echoing in my head: “We — the dogs being hunted — see only fragments of the play in which we act.” 
 
Still, if anybody asks me how I feel about Rutte’s statement, I say: “Yes, I believe in forgiveness”. Despite the nature of the Dutch apology as a conceptual construct, I always remember what Monginsidi did. The young guerrila leader in Makassar forgave the Dutch soldiers before they executed him on September 5, 1949.
 
But what do the words “systematic violence” really mean? Revolution is not a dinner party, as Mao Zedong once said; it implies ambition and murder. Neither is counter-revolutionary politics of repression. In the modern histories of China, Algeria,  and Indonesia, both the revolutionaries and their enemies have their own slaughterhouses.
 
This does not mean that everything is blurred and that there can be no judgment. To me, it is clear what the words “extreme violence” mean: they refer to colonialism itself. Colonialism is an evil institution, built on arrogance and greed, based on an “ideology” that was used to justify treating Indonesians  (and many other peoples elsewhere) as less than human, as subhuman slaves. 
 
And that is something I can never forgive.

Thursday, July 22, 2021

Carmel Budiardjo: A Lifetime Campaigning for Everyone in Indonesia

Andreas Harsono

Multatuli Project

In August 2005, I visited Carmel Budiardjo, then an 80-year-old human rights campaigner, in her London townhouse. We talked on the second floor, which was also the office for Tapol, the human rights organization that she helped set up in 1973 (in Indonesian, the word “tapol” stands for tahanan politik – political prisoner).

In the 1970s, Tapol led a global campaign to release the approximately 30,000 political prisoners held by the then-dictator, Soeharto. It prompted US President Jimmy Carter in 1978 to call for the prisoners’ release. Soeharto released almost all of them, keeping several dozen jailed in Jakarta. Tapol later became a leading voice on rights issues in Indonesia, particularly in the troubled areas of Aceh, East Timor and West Papua.

Carmel, who passed away in London on July 10 at 96, is among the very few people whose work in the region has been recognized in both conservative Muslim areas, like Aceh, and predominantly Christian areas, like East Timor and West Papua. Her efforts to release and then help political prisoners were immeasurable. In 1995, she received the Right Livelihood Award in Sweden. In August 2009, East Timorese President José Ramos-Horta, who had helped campaign for East Timor’s independence from Indonesia, presented her with the Order of Timor Leste. She also received awards from independent groups in Aceh and West Papua. She is probably the only person to receive such wide recognition from so many diverse groups in this archipelago.

In 2005, she and I talked about why many people living in Java, Indonesia’s most populous island and home to the capital, were oblivious to the disparities between Java, as Indonesia’s “core”, and the “outer islands” (which the Dutch colonists called the Buitengewesten, or Outer Territories). 

“It also applied to me when I lived in Jakarta in the 1950s,” she told me. 

“Only when I left Indonesia in 1971, I began to understand the problem. I was caught up by the concept of the liberation of West Papua in the 1960s. I had to be outside Indonesia to begin to think about the reality of Indonesia. West Papua is not necessarily a legitimate part of Indonesia.”

Carmel also spoke about the underlying causes of human rights abuses in Indonesia. The notions of a nation-state and a sense of equal citizenship are very thin in Indonesia. Many dominant identities, whether as Muslims or ethnic Javanese, are often used to discriminate against and repress minorities, which frequently led to violence. 

“I am not an advocate of breaking apart Indonesia,” she told me. 

“But in West Papua and Aceh, there are strong feelings of injustice and their own nationalisms. West Papua was an international issue. The Act of Free Choice in 1969 was an absolute fraud.”

Carmel was born in London in 1925, between the two world wars, into a Jewish family, whose anti-fascist views influenced her left-wing politics. In 1947, she met Suwondo Budiardjo, a young Indonesian official, in Prague. They married and moved to Jakarta in 1952. She worked as a translator and later wrote economic analyses and speeches for both President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party. When General Soeharto toppled Sukarno in 1965, her husband was jailed for “political offenses” and spent 12 years in prison without trial. Carmel herself spent three years in detention, also without trial, before her deportation in 1971. She wrote about these years in her heartbreaking memoir, Surviving Indonesia’s Gulag.

When she returned to London, her townhouse became a gathering place for activists from all backgrounds. Over Chinese food, she told me about the need for raising awareness about nation building and the stories of political prisoners, as well as about her hopes for Timor Leste, a new nation that ended Indonesia’s occupation and had no political prisoners.

Though much time passed since we last spoke, all of our conversations are still relevant to the challenges Indonesians and others face today. Carmel was a towering figure. As James Ross, a longtime Human Rights Watch colleague, wrote after hearing of her passing, “If there were a human rights movement Hall of Fame, Carmel would have been one of the first inductees.”


Andreas Harsono works for Human Rights Watch. He is the author of Race, Islam and Power: Ethnic and Religious Violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia (2019), in which excerpts of his interview with Carmel Budiardjo were first published.


Monday, November 30, 2020

Human Rights Abuses in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Menschenrechte in Indonesien und Timor-Leste 2020
Watch Indonesia!

In July 1997, when the Asian economic crisis began to hit Indonesia, as a journalist, I also began to travel to many parts of Indonesia, the world’s fourth most-populated country, covering the disappearance of staple foods from markets and suppression of uprisings.

In May 1998, President Suharto stepped down after 33 years in power. But the violence became bigger with many ethnic and religious groups trying to seize more political power and economic benefit from Java Island -- Indonesia’s most important island where both Suharto and his predecessor Sukarno had centralized governance since the 1950s.

On Sumatra Island, Aceh freedom fighters openly organized their ceremonies with AK-47s, having deadly clashes with the Indonesian military. On Kalimantan Island, at least 6,500 ethnic Madurese minorities were massacred as rival ethnic Dayak and Malay militants flaunted their muscles, demanding more say in governing the natural resource-rich island. On Sulawesi Island, the tension broke off around Lake Poso in which 600 people were killed in the Muslim-versus-Christian violence. 

East Timor was burned after Indonesia lost in the August 1999 referendum, opening the gate of history, and making the tiny nation a new sovereign state. In Papua and West Papua provinces, state repression against indigenous people simply continued with new forest concessions and mining operations. 

The biggest violence, however, took place in the Moluccas Islands where Christian militias battling Muslim jihadists, involving a large Salafi group that sent more than 5,000 fighters from Java. Several Afghanistan war veterans, including Al Qaeda’s operators, also went to the Moluccas Islands. It killed at least 25,000 people between 1999 and 2005. At least, 90,000 people were killed in that violent period in Indonesia.

In Jakarta, student protesters demanded, “Reformasi.” It was the most difficult battle cry.

Alas, the world did not know about the Indonesian violence.

Al Qaeda launched the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, triggering the United States-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Arab Spring and war in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East sucked up the international media’s attention.

It reminded me how the Vietnam War had also overshadowed the 1965-69 massacres that took place against communists in Indonesia, killing around 1 million people and outlawing then the third largest communist party in the world (after China and the Soviet Union).

General Suharto rose to power after those mass killings – the biggest one in the history of Indonesia. Post-Suharto presidents did little to address those gross human rights violations, nurturing the culture of impunity and violence. It should not shock any observer when mass violence also took place after Suharto’s departure. 

But President B.J. Habibie allowed a U.N. referendum in East Timor in 1999. President Abdurrahman Wahid revoked the ban on Chinese language, Chinese characters, and Confucianism. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono agreed to a European Union-sponsored peace negotiation on Aceh in 2005.

In 2004, the Indonesian parliament passed the local governance law, decentralizing much of the central authorities to the provinces and regencies. The law says that six sectors will remain the domain of the central government: foreign affairs; defense; policing; judiciary; fiscal, monetary; and religious affairs. But responsibility for everything else, from handing over forest concessions to managing education, was handed over to provincial authorities.

The idea to establish Islamic sharia – something that had been debated since 1945-- emerged again via that law, prompting Muslim politicians in predominantly Muslim provinces to write ordinances that meet “Islamic values.”

Yudhoyono, who ruled between 2004 and 2014, accommodated those demands, ignoring the religious affairs restrictions in the autonomy law. His administration strengthened the blasphemy law office, within the Attorney General Office, prosecuting and jailing 125 individuals for blasphemy in a decade --a steep rise from only 10 cases in the four decades after Sukarno wrote the 1965 blasphemy law.

The blasphemy law recognizes only six religions in Indonesia: Islam; Protestantism; Catholicism; Hinduism; Buddhism; Confucianism. Under the Yudhoyono administration, it was also expanded to discriminate against smaller non-Islam Sunni minorities such as Ahmadiyah and Shia. In 2016, a derivative of the blasphemy law was used to force the violent eviction of more than 7,000 members of the Gafatar religious community from their farm houses on Kalimantan Island.

The blasphemy law became a political weapon to mobilize Muslims, including against Jakarta Governor Basuki Purnama, himself a Christian, in the 2017 local election in which 500,000 Muslim protesters demanded the government to prosecute Purnama. He lost the election and ended up in prison for two years.

In 2006, the Yudhoyono administration also introduced the “religious harmony” regulation, replacing the constitutional principle of “religious freedom.” The principle of “religious harmony” is that the majority has the veto power over the minorities. His administration set up “Religious Harmony Forums” in every province, city, and regency, as “advisory bodies” to approve new houses of worship and other religious matters. The composition of the forums should be proportional with the compositions of the six religions, which in practice entrenches discrimination against minorities. It prompted the closure of more than 1,000 churches in a decade across Indonesia.

Yudhoyono’s  administration tolerated local politicians writing discriminatory regulations against women and girls. In 2016, Indonesia’s National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) identified more than 400 discriminatory national and local regulations that harm women, including forcing women and girls to wear the hijab in government buildings, schools, or other public places. They also included curfews, sex segregated sitting areas, and other restrictions against women and girls. The hijab regulations mandate that women and girls wear hijabs, prohibiting them from wearing close-fitting clothing, and requiring them to cover their bodies except their hands, feet, and face.

Some provinces and regencies have introduced local rules that force even non-Muslim girls to wear hijabs, such as West Sumatra and Aceh on Sumatra, and Yogyakarta and Banyuwangi on Java. Some politicians argued that non-Muslim schoolgirls should “adapt” to the Muslim majority. On Lombok Island, a regent even asked female Muslim civil servants to wear the niqab –a full veil that covers the face but their eyes—as well as long dresses that do not reveal the shapes of their bodies.

Gross human rights violations that took place since President Sukarno declared independence in 1945, including the 1965-69 massacres, as well as ethnic and religious violence after the fall of President Suharto, have not been addressed. President Yudhoyono also avoided a U.N. investigation on abuses in East Timor, having only rudimentary trials against some local officials but not touching Indonesian military and police generals involved in the looting and killings there.

When Joko “Jokowi” Widodo won the presidential election in 2014, he promised to find “missing people,” including the famous poet-cum-dissident Wiji Thukul, and to promote religious tolerance. His administration organized a 2015 symposium on the 1965-69 massacres and released Papuan and Moluccan political prisoners, but he stopped there. He did nothing to revoke discriminatory regulations against women and girls or religious minorities. His administration soon arrested Papua and Moluccan activists again, continuing decades of arbitrary detention of political prisoners. Jokowi also tolerated the rise of discriminatory regulations against LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) individuals.

Jokowi and his Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) chose to use “Pancasila” to promote religious tolerance.

Pancasila was a political compromise made during the declaration of independence in 1945. Pancasila, which is about five principles for Indonesia, was included in the opening of the Constitution. The prepared text began with the first principle that the Republic of Indonesia is based on “the belief in the One and Only God, with the obligation to abide by Islamic law for adherents of Islam.”

On August 17, 1945, delegates from East Indonesia, which included Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Bali, and the Moluccas Islands, successfully argued that the sharia phrase be removed or else they “won’t join Indonesia.” Other Muslim leaders compromised with Pancasila becoming only “Belief in One God.”

But the Sukarno and Suharto regimes used the notion of Pancasila to justify the elimination of their opponents. Suharto used Pancasila to legitimize the mass killings. One of the biggest militias in Indonesia uses Pancasila in its name. It is not a surprise that some Muslim organizations oppose the PDIP’s move to introduce a Pancasila indoctrination law. It is obviously not the answer to eliminate discriminatory regulations and to protect human rights.

Post-Suharto electoral democracy helped reduce ethnic and religious violence but civil liberties, press freedom, women’s rights, children’s rights, religious freedom, and the rights of the minorities, are in decline.

Some popular movements have emerged such as the #ReformasiDikorupsi hashtag (reformasi has been corrupted). In 2019, hundreds of thousands of students, indigenous peoples, and minorities protested when the parliament tried to pass a new Criminal Code with more discriminatory articles that would violate rights. Some Indonesian students began to challenge racism against dark skinned Papuans like the #BlackLivesMatter in the U.S, organizing unprecedented protests against the criminalization of Papuan students and activists.

Indonesian leaders need to learn from the failures of the last seven decades in not addressing past human rights abuses and prevent these historical burdens from being passed down to future generations.


Andreas Harsono works for Human Rights Watch, based in Jakarta, recently published his book Race, Islam and Power: Ethnic and Religious Violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia.

Tuesday, April 16, 2019

Indonesia’s political system has ‘failed’ its minorities – like West Papuans

By David Robie
Asia Pacific Report

A human rights defender and researcher has warned in a new book published on the eve of the Indonesian national elections tomorrow that the centralised political system has failed many of the country’s 264 million people – especially minorities and those at the margins, such as in West Papua.

Author Andreas Harsono also says a “radical change is needed in the mindset of political leaders” and he is not optimistic for such changes after the election.

Harsono is author of Race, Islam and Power: Ethnic and Religious Violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia, a book based on 15 years of research and travel between Sabang in Aceh in the west and Merauke in West Papua in the East.

Founding President Sukarno used the slogan “from Sabang to Merauke” when launching a campaign – ultimately successful – to seize West Papua in 1961.

But, as Harsono points out, the expression should really be from Rondo Island (an unpopulated islet) to Sota (a remote border post on the Papua New Guinean boundary).

Harsono, a former journalist and Human Rights Watch researcher since 2008, argues that Indonesia might have been more successful by creating a federation rather than a highly centralised state controlled from Jakarta.

“Violence on post-Suharto Indonesia, from Aceh to West Papua, from Kalimantan to the Moluccas, is evidence that Java-centric nationalism is unable to distribute power fairly in an imagined Indonesia,” he says. “It has created unnecessary paranoia and racism among Indonesian migrants in West Papua.

‘They’re Melanesians’

“The Papuans simply reacted by saying they’re Melanesians – not Indonesians. They keep questioning the manipulation of the United Nations-sponsored Act of Free Choice in 1969.”

Critics and cynics have long dismissed what they see as a deeply flawed process involving only 1025 voters selected by the Indonesian military as the “Act of No Choice”.

Harsono’s criticisms have been borne out by a range of Indonesian activist and watchdog groups, who say the generals behind the two presidential frontrunners are ridden with political interests.

The Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) and the Mining Advocacy Network (JATAM) have again warned that both presidential candidate tickets — incumbent President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and running mate Ma’ruf Amin as well as rival Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno — have close ties with retired TNI (Indonesian military) generals.

These retired officers are beholden to political interests and the prospect of resolving past human rights violations will “become increasingly bleak” no matter who is elected as the next president.

Kontras noted that nine out of the 27 retired officers who are behind Widodo and Ma’ruf have a “problematic track record on human rights”.

“Likewise with Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno where there are eight retired officers who were allegedly involved in past cases of HAM violations”, said Kontras researcher Rivanlee Anandar.

Prabowo himself, a former special forces commander, is implicated in many human rights abuses. He has been accused of abduction and torture of 23 pro-democracy activists in the late 1990s and he is regarded as having knowledge of the killing hundreds of civilians in Santa Cruz massacre in Timor-Leste.

90,000 killed post-Suharto

Harsono’s 280-page book, with seven chapters devoted to regions of Indonesia, documents an ”internally complex and riven nation” with an estimated 90,000 people having been killed in the decade after Suharto’s departure.

“In East Timor, President Suharto’s successor B. J. Habibie agreed to have a referendum [on independence]. Indonesia lost and it generated a bloodbath,” says Harsono.

“Habibie’s predecessors, Megawati Sukanoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, refused to admit [that] the Indonesian military’s occupation, despite a United Nations’ finding, had killed 183,000 people between 1975 and 1999.”

Harsono notes how in 1945 Indonesia’s “non-Javanese founders Mohammad Hatta, Sam Ratu Langie and Johannes Latuharhary wanted an Indonesia that was democratic and decentralised. They advocated a federation.”

However, Sukarno, Supomo and Mohammad Yamin wanted instead a centralised unitarian state.

“Understanding the urgency to fight incoming Dutch troops, Latuharhary accepted Supomo’s proposal but suggested the new republic hold a referendum as soon as it became independent. Sukarno agreed but this decision has never been executed.”

The establishment of a unitarian state “naturally created the Centre”, says Harsono. “Jakarta has been accumulated and controlling political, cultural, educational, economic, informational and ideological power.

Java benefits

“The closer a region to Jakarta, the better it will benefit from the Centre. Java is the closest to the Centre.

“The further a region is from the Centre, the more neglected it will be. West Papua, Aceh, East Timor and the Moluccas are among those furthest away from Jakarta.”

The centralised political system needed a “long and complex bureaucracy” and this “naturally created corruption”, Harsono explains.

“Indonesia is frequently ranked as the most corrupt country in Asia. Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Ltd listed Indonesia as the most corrupt country in Asia in 2005.”

Harsono also notes how centralised power has helped a religious and ethnic majority that sees itself as “justified to have privileges and to rule over the minorities”.

The author cites the poet Leon Agasta as saying, “They’re the two most dangerous words in Indonesia: Islam and Java.” Muslim majority and Javanese dominance.

Harsono regards the Indonesian government’s response to demands for West Papuan “self-determination” as “primarily military and repressive: viewing Papuan ‘separatists’ as criminals, traitors and enemies of the Republic of Indonesia”.

He describes this policy as a “recipe for ongoing military operations to search for and destroy Papuan ‘separatists’, a term that could be applied to a large, if not overwhelming, portion of the Papuan population”.

Ruthless Indonesian military

“The Indonesian military, having lost their previous power bases in east Timor and Aceh, ruthlessly maintain their control over West Papua, both as a power base and as considerable source of revenue.

“The Indonesian military involvement in legal businesses, such as mining and logging, and allegedly, illegal businesses, such as alcohol, prostitution, extortion and wildlife smuggling, provide significant funds for the military as an organisation and also for individual officers.”

Pro-independence leaders have called on West Papuans to boycott the Indonesian elections tomorrow.

Andreas Harsono launched his journalism career as a reporter for the Bangkok-based Nation and the Kuala Lumpur-based Star newspapers. In the 1990s, he helped establish Indonesia’s Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) – then an illegal group under the Suharto regime, and today the most progressive journalists union in the republic.

Harsono was also founder of the Jakarta-based Institute for the Studies on the Free Flow of Information and of the South East Asia Press Alliance (SEAPA).

In a separate emailed interview with me in response to a question about whether there was light at the end of the tunnel, Harsono replied: I do not want to sound pessimistic but visiting dozens of sites of mass violence, seeing survivors and families’ who lost their lost ones, I just realised that mass killings took place all over Indonesia.

“It’s not only about the 1965 massacres –despite them being the biggest of all– but also the Papuans, the Timorese, the Acehnese, the Madurese etc.

“Basically all major islands in Indonesia, from Sumatra to Papua, have witnessed huge violence and none of them have been professionally understood. The truth of those mass killings have not been found yet.”


Professor David Robie is director of the Pacific Media Centre.


Wednesday, August 17, 2016

Nasionalisme dan Pluralisme


Perayaan Kemerdekaan Indonesia di Kampus Mubarak bersama berbagai organisasi keagamaan, dari Islam sampai Kristen, dari Buddha sampai aliran kepercayaan. 

Nasionalisme adalah rasa memiliki yang bisa naik dan bisa turun. Ia bukan barang mati.

Kekecewaan terhadap Indonesia --terutama diskriminasi, ketidakadilan, pelanggaran hak asasi manusia, korupsi dan kerusakan lingkungan hidup-- bisa mengurangi rasa memiliki tsb.

Harapan akan perubahan. Pemimpin yang tulus dan berani. Penegakan hukum dengan adil. Mereka akan meningkatkan rasa memiliki terhadap Indonesia.
Nasionalisme adalah ideologi modern. Ia pasangan dari pluralisme.

Logikanya?

Tak ada bangsa yang homogen, yang etnik, yang agama, yang kelasnya, sama semua. Maka diciptakanlah "masyarakat khayalan" dimana pluralisme ditata dengan dasar kesetaraan: hak dan kewajiban sama. Semua warga dari masyarakat ini setara di mata hukum.

Nasionalisme tak mengenal mayoritas dan minoritas. Nasionalisme tak mengenal penduduk asli atau pendatang. Dia yang Jawa setara dgn dia yang Papua. Dia yang Sunni setara dgn dia yang Ahmadiyah. Dia yang heterosexual setara dgn dia yang gay atau lesbian. Dia yang lelaki, tentu saja, setara dgn perempuan.

Perayaan Kemerdekaan Indonesia di paroki Katholik Santa Clara di Bekasi. Mereka akhirnya mendapat izin mendirikan bangunan gereja sesudah mencoba selama 16 tahun. Mereka merayakan dengan sebuah misa dimana anggotanya pakai berbagai pakaian tradisional
GKI Yasmin dan HKBP Filadelfia merayakan Kemerdekaan Indonesia dengan ibadah bersama di sebuah sudut Monumen Nasional. Mereka bikin ibadah di lapangan sejak pemerintah daerah Bogor dan Bekasi menolak menghormati keputusan Mahkamah Agung memberikan izin bangunan gereja. 

Tuesday, August 19, 2014

Indonesian province turns up Sharia law after devastating tsunami


Islamic Sharia law was fairly dormant in the Indonesian province of Aceh until a massive earthquake and tsunami struck in 2004, killing more than 130,000. But as residents rebuild, Sharia officers have strengthened their grip, threatening rights of religious minorities and women. Special correspondent Kira Kay reports.


JUDY WOODRUFF: We turn now to Indonesia, where one province, in the wake of the devastating tsunami of 2004, has embraced Islamic Sharia law.

Special correspondent Kira Kay recently traveled to Aceh province, where she was given special access to the religious police force, to bring us this inside look at how Sharia is impacting the everyday life of residents.

KIRA KAY: It’s Friday noon, time for the most important prayers of the week at mosques around the Indonesian city of Banda Aceh.
Besides the call to prayer, you can hear another sound on the streets, the loudspeaker from the Sharia police patrol.

WOMAN (through interpreter): Exit and head to the mosque in order to do Friday prayers.

KIRA KAY: Shops and restaurants are supposed to be closed during prayers, but these Sharia officers are tipped off by the motorbikes parked out front the seemingly shuttered entrances, and they break up the clandestine lunch plans of this roomful of men.

Alongside a secular legal system, Aceh enforces an official policy of Sharia. While most offenses draw only a scolding from police, there is a court system to try more serious cases, with public caning the ultimate punishment.

Ritasari Pujiastuti is the chief of Banda Aceh’s Sharia police.

RITASARI PUJIASTUTI, Chief, Sharia Police Force (through interpreter): The most common infractions we find are un-Islamic behavior, like not wearing proper clothing. Next is being alone with someone who is not your spouse, particularly in quiet places, and then gambling. We also find a lot of alcoholic drinks. We also get reports from citizens telling us whenever a Sharia violation happens in a given neighborhood.

KIRA KAY: Sitting at the northernmost tip of Indonesia, Aceh is nicknamed the verandah of Mecca. Islam first came to the country through here.

Aceh fought a three-decade war for independence from the rest of Indonesia. It didn’t win, but was given special autonomy that included Sharia. So far, Aceh is the only province in Indonesia to be given this special right.

Banda Aceh Mayor Illiza Sa’Aduddin has made Sharia a priority.

MAYOR ILLIZA SA’ADUDDIN DJAMAL, Banda Aceh (through interpreter): We are very proud that Aceh got to do this first, that this blessing was bestowed on us. Even though there are shortcomings, we are glad to be able to live under Sharia.

KIRA KAY: The system sat fairly dormant until after 2004, when a massive earthquake and ensuing tsunami rocked Aceh, killing 130,000 people. Many citizens felt the disaster was God’s punishment for their lack of devoutness, evidenced by the mosques that remained standing amidst fields of rubble.

Acehnese renewed their dedication to their faith. The tsunami recovery process also opened up long-closed Aceh to the world, and its vices, says police chief Ritasari.

RITASARI PUJIASTUTI (through interpreter): We need to constantly monitor people’s behaviors by patrol or raid because there are a lot of outside influences coming from all sides. We are safeguarding people, particularly the younger generation, who are drawn towards this wave of globalization.

KIRA KAY: Mayor Sa’Aduddin says Sharia is part of Aceh’s rebuilding process.

ILLIZA SA’ADUDDIN DJAMAL (through interpreter): We are really grateful to everyone who has helped us with the recovery and rehabilitation. Without their help, we wouldn’t be where we are today. Our challenge is to ensure that Islamic values remain in people’s hearts, so that we can build on this development in a positive way, through a generation that contributes to society.

KIRA KAY: Among young citizens of Aceh, there’s some surprising agreement with the concerns of the mayor and police chief. Sanusi was stopped by the Sharia police for driving with female friends after dark.

SANUSI (through interpreter): I was nervous when it happened, but I feel the rules are good for society, especially to guide the lives and behaviors of young people. Yes, sometimes, we feel embarrassed or annoyed, but when the Sharia police give us words of advice, we understand they are for the good of all.

EVA AGUSTINA (through interpreter): Personally, I feel comfortable. I can also express myself with the latest Islamic fashion.

KIRA KAY: At the Islamic university, young students debate the laws amongst themselves.

MASHITAH (through interpreter): People view the Sharia as something extreme. But I think Sharia is there to establish boundaries, not to imprison us.

SEPTIA MULIA (through interpreter): I don’t agree that everything should be regulated. I think it is us who should regulate ourselves, not the government who establishes what we can or can’t do.

KIRA KAY: The restrictions on young people are significant, because Sharia prohibits the close interactions of unmarried people. Banda Aceh’s only cinema was shut down, and the music scene has been censored, with some of the city’s famous punks themselves convicted of Sharia violations.

Young people can still go to the beach, but it closes at dark to avoid improper behavior, causing traffic jams at the gate. Billboards sponsored by the city remind citizens that unmarried couples cannot be alone together. This young couple knows they are breaking the law, but they have nowhere else to go and are willing to take the risk.

Other youth have taken a cat-and-mouse approach, like these young women, who are wearing lawbreaking, though stylish, pencil pants.

DEWI NURHALIZA (through interpreter): We just have to be careful. If we see the Sharia police, we run.

NURUL FITRI (through interpreter): Of course we won’t just stand there and get arrested. I could never bear the shame.

KIRA KAY: But beyond these lifestyle infringements lurk more serious human rights concerns, as Aceh’s interpretation of Sharia broadens.

ANDREAS HARSONO, Human Rights Watch: By giving the Sharia to Aceh, the Indonesians basically opened the Pandora’s box.

KIRA KAY: Andreas Harsono is with Human Rights Watch.

ANDREAS HARSONO: There are two groups that are actually threatened by this formalization of the Sharia. The first group is religious minorities. More than 20 churches are closed down in Aceh over the last two years. They also banned 14 Islamic religious sects, like the Ahmadiyya, the Shia. We didn’t expect that.

The second victim is women. There are various, strange regulations being produced, for instance, banning women from straddling motorcycles. In some areas, women cannot wear pants to go to work or to go to school, which means that it will restrict their mobilities. Ultimately, it will affect their economic rights. Ultimately, it will affect their education.

KIRA KAY: We were given special access to follow the Sharia police on their daily rounds.

WOMAN (through interpreter): We often come to parks like this, because we can see people dating or not wearing Muslim dress. We try to give them guidance on the scene. But if the violation is more serious, we will bring it to the office.

KIRA KAY: We noticed women being targeted a lot more than men. These store clerks were chased because their uniforms were immodest. So was this mom for not wearing a head scarf. And this troubling scene, the berating of a young woman in the parking lot, after being caught having an affectionate outing with her boyfriend.

WOMAN (through interpreter): You will bring shame to your village. Do you understand?

AZRIANA MANALU, Lawyer, LBH Apik Aceh (through interpreter): When a man violates Sharia, people see it as a misdemeanor. But when it’s a woman, she is automatically seen as a sinner who has no place in society.

KIRA KAY: Azriana Manalu is a lawyer advocating for women facing serious Sharia violations. She says accusations of adultery are particularly traumatizing for women, but even simpler charges can ruin lives.

In 2010, two young women were caned because they were caught selling rice during Ramadan. After their public punishment, Manalu says, they fled their homes for good.

AZRIANA MANALU (through interpreter): The worst kind of punishment for women is the social stigma, even excommunication they receive from their communities. The caning hurts them for only one or two days, but the condemnation is something they will face for the rest of their lives.

KIRA KAY: Manalu also fears that communal tensions are rising as neighbors turn each other in.

AZRIANA MANALU (through interpreter): I don’t think Sharia is what people need right now. What we need is for victims of past conflict to live peacefully. We also need to put an end to corruption. These things should be taken seriously by the government, not this priority on Sharia enforcement.

KIRA KAY: Mayor Sa’Aduddin admits improvements are needed but remains firmly committed to Sharia.

MAYOR ILLIZA SA’ADUDDIN DJAMAL (through interpreter): We don’t want the officers to be authoritarian. They must truly understand their function is not to just punish people, but also to explain why they do this, and tell people not to take the law into their own hands. There must also be clear legal procedures, with witnesses and evidence.

KIRA KAY: There are now new bylaws extending Aceh’s Sharia rules to non-Muslims. For the first time this past Ramadan, Christian Chinese food shops were forced to close during the fasting period, a troubling development for a country long known for its moderate form of Islam.

Meanwhile, other parts of Indonesia are beginning to see Aceh as a model, sending local officials to observe the implementation.

JUDY WOODRUFF: This report is part of the Fault Lines of Faith series produced in partnership with the Bureau for International Reporting.

Thursday, February 24, 2011

Belajar dari Filep Karma

Pelanggaran hak asasi manusia Papua oleh negara Indonesia.

Andreas Harsono


Tahanan politik Papua Barat Filep Karma bersama mamanya, Eklefina Noriwari, sudah usia 75 tahun, di rumah sakit PGI Cikini, Jakarta, pada Juli 2010, ketika Karma menjalani operasi prostate. Pada 3 Desember 2010 Karma dipindah ke tahanan Polda Papua menyusul terjadi kerusuhan dalam penjara Abepura. ©Andreas Harsono

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PADA suatu Minggu Desember 2008, saya berkunjung ke penjara Abepura, sebuah bangunan Belanda di sebuah bukit Port Numbay. Penjara ini menarik karena ada surat dari beberapa organisasi Papua kepada UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak dimana mereka menerangkan berbagai macam siksaan dalam penjara. Ada tahanan dipukul dengan gembok sehingga kunci menembus mata kanan si tahanan. Para pelaku, tiga orang sipir penjara, tampaknya immune dari hukuman. Tendangan dan pukulan terkesan masalah biasa di Abepura. Air minum juga masalah. Makanan bermutu buruk.

Minggu yang tenang. Saya melewati tempat pemeriksaan. Anthonius Ayorbaba, kepala penjara, minta semua barang ditaruh di tempat penitipan. Saya pun dipersilahkan masuk dalam aula penjara, bergabung dengan sekitar 30 pengunjung, yang hendak merayakan ibadah Minggu. Pendeta naik ke mimbar. Bernyanyi. Berdoa. Mendengar khotbah.

Seorang lelaki duduk dekat saya. Brewok lebat dan memakai bendera Bintang Kejora kecil di dada. Namanya, Filep Karma, seorang tahanan politik Papua. Saya berbisik bahwa saya seorang wartawan, sedang cari bahan soal siksaan dalam penjara. Ibadah selesai. Dia memperkenalkan saya kepada beberapa tahanan politik lain: Ferdinand Pakage dan Luis Gedi.

Pakage berbadan besar, kulit hitam, orang Mee. Mata kanan terlihat kempes. Dia tak bicara banyak. Dia hanya cerita kepala sering pusing sesudah mata kanan dia ditusuk kunci oleh seorang sipir penjara pada September 2008. Dua sipir lain menendang dan memukul dengan tongkat karet. Pakage dipenjara karena dinyatakan bersalah bunuh polisi bernama Rahman Arizona dalam demonstrasi depan kampus Universitas Cendrawasih pada 16 Maret 2006. Pakage bilang dia ada di rumah saat kejadian. Polisi menangkap dia pada petang hari 16 Maret. Polisi menyiram air panas ke badan Pakage. Mereka memukul dia hingga berdarah dari kepala, bibir, kaki, tangan dan badan.

Pakage berpendapat kesaksian dari dua orang, yang dihadirkan jaksa terhadap dirinya—terdiri dari Luis Gedi (teman Pakage) dan Alia Mustafa Samori (seorang polisi)— tak bisa dipercaya. Polisi menangkap dan menyiksa Gedi ketika dia pulang dari toko siang itu. Gedi seorang penjaga toko. Petang itu dia mengantar seorang kawan perempuan, etnik Minahasa, pulang ke rumah karena keadaan tegang. Gedi bilang pada saya dia terpaksa mengaku bunuh polisi Rahman Arizona. Polisi mendesaknya kasih nama tersangka lain. Gedi asal bicara dan sebut nama kawan dia: tukang parkir Ferdinand Pakage.

“Dong polisi ada lebih 20 pukul sa. Sa bilang sa buang pisau depan kampus. Tra tahan dipukul.”

Ketika polisi membawa Pakage ke kampus, tentu saja, mereka tak menemukan pisau. Seorang perwira polisi menembak kaki Pakage. Dia lantas mengarang cerita pisau ada di rumah. Maka polisi pun mencari pisau. Dapat pisau Kiwi milik mama Pakage.

Papa Ferdinand, Petrus Pakage, mengatakan kasus anak dia, “Semua itu tipu-tipu. Saya menandatangani dokumen itu dan menyerahkan kaos dan pisau dapur. Tapi pisau itu dipakai buat potong sayur. Dorang pu mama selalu simpan di rumah.”

Di pengadilan Abepura, Ferdinand Pakage dihukum 20 tahun penjara. Tanpa ada satu pun saksi dari pihak Pakage.

“Dorang pengacara tra bela,” katanya.

Filep Karma sendiri orang Biak, pegawai negeri berumur 51 tahun. Dia ditahan sejak Desember 2004. Karma adalah anggota keluarga elite di Papua. Ayahnya, Andreas Karma, termasuk bupati paling populer di Papua. Dia menjabat bupati Wamena pada 1970-an serta Serui pada 1980-an. Pada 1979, Filep Karma studi ilmu politik di Universitas Sebelas Maret, Solo, Pulau Jawa. Dia lulus 1987 dan mulai bekerja sebagai pegawai negeri di Port Numbay. Dia menikah dengan Ratu Karel Lina, seorang perempuan Melayu-Jawa, kelahiran 1960 di Tanjung Pinang, Kepulauan Riau. Pada 1997, Karma menerima beasiswa untuk mengikuti kursus 11 bulan di Asian Institute of Management, Manila. Ketika terbang ke Jakarta pada Mei 1998, dia mempelajari protes mahasiswa Universitas Trisakti terhadap pemerintahan diktator Suharto. Dia hanya dua hari ada di Jakarta ketika aparat keamanan menembak mati beberapa mahasiswa Trisakti.

“Kalau terus ikut Indonesia, penduduk asli Papua akan terus dianiaya. Mungkin 20 hingga 30 tahun lagi sudah habis kebudayaan Papua. Artinya, orang Papua juga sudah habis,” katanya.

Sekembali ke Papua, Karma mulai mendukung secara terbuka kemerdekaan Papua. Pada 2 Juli 1998, dia ikut mengatur aksi pro-kemerdekaan dan mengibarkan bendera Bintang Kejora di kota Biak. Human Rights Watch dalam laporan Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Irian Jaya melaporkan bahwa seorang sersan polisi masuk ke kalangan demonstran. Dia dianggap hendak provokasi. Dia dipukul dan beberapa gigi patah. Ini menciptakan bentrok. Polisi berusaha membubarkan demonstrasi, selama empat hari.

Pada 6 Juli 1998, militer Indonesia mengambil-alih Pulau Biak, mendatangkan bantuan dari Batalion 733 Ambon dan menembaki para pengunjuk rasa dari empat sisi. Jumlah korban tewas belum diketahui. Banyak mayat dilaporkan dimuat ke dalam truk dan diduga dibuang ke laut dari dua kapal TNI Angkatan Laut. Karma menduga banyak mayat dikubur seadanya di pulau-pulau kecil dekat Biak. Dia memperkirakan lebih dari 100 orang terbunuh. Pemerintah Indonesia tak lakukan penyelidikan serius atas insiden itu.

Karma terluka di kaki oleh peluru karet. Polisi menangkap 150 orang. Hanya 19 diadili termasuk Karma. Mereka menahan Karma dari 6 Juli sampai 3 Oktober 1998. Pada 25 Januari 1999, pengadilan negeri Biak menyatakan dia bersalah dengan tuduhan makar karena memimpin aksi dan pidato. Pengadilan Biak jatuhkan hukuman penjara 6,5 tahun. 

Karma ajukan banding. Dia bebas demi hukum pada 20 November 1999. Karma mendapat abolisi dari Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid. Nama baiknya dipulihkan. Karma dianggap tak melakukan kekerasan, semua protes dilakukan dengan tanpa kekerasan. 

Dia kembali bekerja sebagai pegawai negeri. Pekerjaan Karma terutama melatih calon pegawai negeri di Papua. Dia banyak bicara pada mahasiswa. Dia mengatur program pelatihan dimana orang muda belajar soal sistem administrasi, hukum maupun birokrasi Indonesia.

Pada 1 Desember 2004, sesudah yakin program otonomi Papua disabot oleh pemerintah Indonesia, antara lain lewat pemecahan Papua dalam banyak kabupaten, Karma mengorganisir sebuah upacara peringatan 1 Desember 2004 —untuk menandakan ulang tahun kedaulatan Papua pada 1 Desember 1961. Peristiwa ini dihadiri ratusan pelajar dan mahasiswa Papua, yang berteriak “merdeka!” serta memasang bendera Bintang Kejora. Mereka juga menyerukan penolakan terhadap otonomi yang dinilai gagal.

Polisi membubarkan paksa unjuk rasa itu. Bentrokan pecah dan kerumunan orang menyerang polisi dengan balok kayu, batu dan botol. Polisi merespon dengan tembakan ke arah kerumunan. Karma segera ditahan dan dituduh makar. Pada 27 Oktober 2005, pengadilan negeri Abepura menghukum 15 tahun penjara. Rekannya, Yusak Pakage, divonis 10 tahun penjara.

Kini Filep Karma mungkin satu dari pemimpin Papua yang paling populer. Dia diterima di kalangan orang Pegunungan Tengah dan kaum pesisir. Dia tak pernah menganjurkan kekerasan untuk mencapai tujuan itu. Dia berkata, “Kami ingin membuka suatu dialog yang bermartabat dengan pemerintah Indonesia, suatu dialog antara dua orang bermartabat, dan bermartabat berarti kami tidak pakai cara-cara kekerasan.”

Karma menganjurkan saya bezoek Yusak Pakage di rumah sakit Abepura. Ketika keluar dari penjara, saya naik taxi menuju rumah sakit, untuk bertemu Yusak Pakage. Dia cerita bagaimana dia dipukul dalam penjara. Pakage bilang sejak Anthonius Ayorbaba menjadi kepala penjara, dua bulan lalu, dia minta waktu bisa bicara dengan Ayorbaba. Kami cerita panjang dan lebar. Tak kami sangka, tiba-tiba Ayorbaba datang ke kamar Yusak Pakage, tanya kesehatan lantas mengajak baca Bible dan berdoa. Saya mohon undur diri. Pakage sempat mengeryitkan mata pada saya.

Perkenalan ini merupakan awal dari serangkaian interview saya terhadap para tahanan politik di Papua untuk Human Rights Watch. Saya juga bikin interview di Sentani, Manokwari, Fakfak, Nabire maupun Wamena. Selama setahun lebih, saya mengumpulkan berkas-berkas para tapol, belakangan juga para tapol Alifuru dari Kepulauan Ambon. Menurut anthropolog George J. Aditjondro, etnik Papua dan Alifuru disebut “Melanesia Barat.” Nama Melanesia berasal dari kata Latin “melano” (hitam) dan “nesos” (kepulauan). Artinya, kepulauan milik orang-orang berkulit hitam. Saya suka istilah itu: tahanan politik Melanesia. Saya wawancara lebih dari 50 tapol Melanesia di Indonesia, antara 2008 hingga 2010, selama setahun lebih.

Human Rights Watch menerbitkan penelitian ini pada Juni 2010 dengan judul, Prosecuting Criminal Aspiration: Indonesia’s Political Prisoners. Laporan ini minta pemerintah Indonesia membebaskan lebih dari 100 tahanan politik di Papua maupun kepulauan Maluku. Mereka dinilai tidak bersalah. Mereka hanya menyatakan aspirasi mereka untuk merdeka dari Indonesia. Menyatakan pendapat adalah bagian dari kebebasan berpendapat. Ia dilindungi hukum Indonesia maupun International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, sebuah traktat internasional, yang diratifikasi Indonesia pada 2006. Pada 16 Agustus 2010, 25 organisasi hak asasi manusia dari Amerika Serikat, Australia, Eropa, Indonesia dan Timor Leste mengirim surat dan minta Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono membebaskan para tapol Melanesia. Mereka termasuk Aliansi Nasional Timor Leste Ba Tribunal Internasional, Australia West Papua Association Melbourne, Free West Papua Campaign UK, Freunde der Naturvolker e.V., Human Rights Watch, Kontras, Land is Life, La'o Hamutuk (Timor Leste), Perkumpulan HAK, Tapol dan West Papua Advocacy Team.

Namun pemerintahan Presiden Yudhoyono tak menganggap penting untuk membebaskan orang-orang yang tak bersalah ini. Di Jakarta, dia malah dapat kontroversi karena memberikan remisi kepada 300an koruptor, termasuk besan dia sendiri, Aulia Pohan, yang langsung bebas dari penjara. Tampaknya, Yudhoyono lebih suka membebaskan koruptor Indonesia daripada tapol Melanesia.

II

SUATU hari pertengahan Juli 2010, sebulan sesudah peluncuran laporan Human Rights Watch, Izumi Kurimoto dan saya mengunjungi Seichi Okawa di daerah Takadanobaba, Tokyo. Okawa-san adalah direktur Graha Budaya Indonesia (Indonesian Culture Plaza atau インドネシア文化宮), sebuah bangunan tiga tingkat, yang bekerja soal kebudayaan di Indonesia. Lantai satu dijadikan toko dimana dijual macam-macam batik Jawa, tenun ikat Sunda Kecil maupun berbagai barang kerajinan Papua. Ada lukisan Sentani, ada ukiran Asmat. Kami mengobrol sambil minum kopi Wamena. Enak sekali. Kurimoto, seorang mahasiswa, sibuk memotret.

Okawa cerita riset dia soal 40,000 tentara Jepang, yang meninggal di Papua, pada zaman Perang Dunia II. Dia mengatakan sekitar 15,000 kerangka serdadu ada di Pulau Biak. Kebanyakan mereka meninggal karena terkena penyakit atau kelaparan dalam perang menghadapi Sekutu.

Menurut buku An Act of Free Choice: Decolonisation and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua karya P. J. Drooglever, satu divisi Angkatan Darat Jepang dipusatkan di Manokwari pada 1942. Mereka terutama ditugaskan mencegah serangan udara Sekutu. Pasukan Jepang tak masuk ke pedalaman Papua karena ada pasukan-pasukan kecil Belanda yang gerilya di pedalaman. Namun mereka dikalahkan pasukan Sekutu, yang lompat katak, dari Australia, Papua New Guinea, Papua, kepulauan utara Maluku dan Filipina, sebelum masuk ke Okinawa, kepulauan Jepang, pada April-Juni 1945. Gerakan lompat katak ini membuat ribuan pasukan Jepang terlantar di Papua dan kepulauan Maluku karena markas-markas mereka dihancurkan. Mereka melarikan diri sambil kelaparan dan kena malaria.

Saya pernah tahu ada gua di Biak dimana orang bilang kerangka-kerangka serdadu Jepang berserakan. Warga Biak tidak mengutak-atik gua itu. Okawa juga pernah berkunjung ke gua itu.

Sekutu menjatuhkan bom atom ke Hiroshima dan Nagasaki pada 6 dan 9 Agustus 1945. Jepang menyerah kalah. Di Pulau Jawa, para pejuang kemerdekaan memanfaatkan kekalahan Jepang dari Sekutu untuk menyatakan merdeka pada 17 Agustus 1945. Namun ia perlu waktu empat tahun guna diplomasi antara Indonesia, dipimpin oleh Sutan Sjahrir, dengan Kerajaan Belanda.

Belanda mengakui kedaulatan Indonesia pada 27 Desember 1949. Namun Papua masih di bawah administrasi Kerajaan Belanda. Belanda mempersiapkan sekelompok elite Papua untuk bisa mengatur diri mereka sendiri. Asumsinya, Papua akan diakui kedaulatan pada 1970. Pada 1 Desember 1961, Papua Raad, sebuah lembaga yang disponsori kerajaan Belanda, menyatakan masyarakat Papua siap mendirikan sebuah negara berdaulat, dan mengibarkan bendera nasional baru yang dinamakan Bintang Kejora.

Keputusan itu membuat Presiden Soekarno marah besar. Dia berpendapat Papua harus menjadi bagian dari Indonesia dan menuduh Kerajaan Belanda berusaha menciptakan “negara boneka” di Papua. Pada 19 Desember 1961, dari kota Jogjakarta, Soekarno memerintahkan pasukan Indonesia untuk menyerbu Papua. Dia memakai slogan “dari Sabang sampai Merauke” –sebuah slogan yang sebenarnya ciptaan perwira Belanda J.B. van Heutsz, yang menaklukkan Aceh pada 1904, dengan sadis 2,900 orang dibunuh, termasuk 1,100 perempuan dan anak-anak. Pada awal 1962, pasukan Indonesia mulai menyusup ke Papua. Ini menciptakan gelombang pengungsi ke Papua New Guinea. Pemerintah Amerika Serikat turun tangan. Setelah negosiasi, Indonesia dan Belanda pun setuju menunjuk PBB mengadakan sebuah referendum bagi Papua. Indonesia minta bukan referendum tapi “musyawarah” ala Indonesia.

Eni Faleomavaega, anggota Kongress Amerika Serikat, dalam hearing soal Papua pada 22 September 2010, mengutip data Congressional Research Service:
“… declassified documents released in July 2004 indicate that the United States supported Indonesia’s take-over of Papua in the lead up to the 1969 Act of Free Choice even as it was understood that such a move was likely unpopular with Papuans. The documents reportedly indicate that the United States estimated that between 85% and 90% of Papuans were opposed to Indonesian rule and that as a result the Indonesians were incapable of winning an open referendum at the time of Papua’s transition from Dutch colonial rule. Such steps were evidently considered necessary to maintain the support of Suharto’s Indonesia during the Cold War.”
Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat, yang diawasi PBB dan direkayasa Amerika Serikat serta Indonesia, berlangsung dari 14 Juli hingga 2 Agustus 1969 di delapan kota: Merauke, Jayawijaya, Paniai, Fak-fak, Sorong, Manokwari, Biak dan Port Numbay. Ia hanya diwakili 1,025 warga Papua, termasuk sebagian orang Indonesia yang dikirim ke Papua. Semua ditentukan pemerintah Indonesia. Mereka dikumpulkan terlebih dahulu oleh tentara Indonesia dalam barak-barak selama enam minggu. Mereka diminta memilih Indonesia … atau dibunuh. Maka mereka bulat-bulat 100 persen memilih integrasi dengan Indonesia. Banyak penduduk Papua memandang Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat merupakan manipulasi Indonesia untuk menduduki Papua.

Dua minggu sesudah kejadian, 16 Agustus 1969, dalam sidang dengan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat di Jakarta, Presiden Soeharto, yang menggantikan Soekarno, menjanjikan otonomi kepada warga Papua. Dalam pidato Soeharto mengatakan:
“Saat ini, dengan selesainya Pepera kita semua telah menunjukkan kepada dunia bahwa seluruh rakyat Indonesia yang berdiam di wilayah-wilayah dari Sabang sampai Merauke, merupakan suatu keluarga bangsa yang tak dapat dipisahkan lagi, Bangsa Indonesia. Tetapi Pepera bukan tujuan akhir kita .… Masalah yang paling penting adalah PEMBANGUNAN daerah Irian Barat secara serentak ... Irian Barat pun segera akan menerima kedudukannya sebagai DAERAH TINGKAT I dengan OTONOMI yang riil dan luas.”
Pada 6 November 1969, Sekretaris Jenderal PBB U Than menyampaikan hasil “musyawarah” kepada Sidang Umum PBB, atau United Nations General Assembly, forum tertinggi perserikatan negara-negara seluruh dunia. Hasilnya, dibicarakan dalam sidang-sidang pada 13 hingga 19 November 1969. Menteri Luar Negeri Adam Malik kuatir melihat “suara Afrika” –termasuk Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Togo, Ghana dan Dahomey-- dalam sidang-sidang PBB. Dia minta pemerintah Britania agar membantu lobby terhadap negara-negara Afrika, yang kritis terhadap hasil Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat, agar mau bicara sendiri dengan delegasi Indonesia. Belgia, Indonesia, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Belanda dan Thailand membuat draft resolusi PBB guna menerima hasil musyawarah di Papua. Akhirnya, ketika voting diambil, 82 negara menerima resolusi dan 30 abstain. Tak ada satu pun negara menolak resolusi PBB soal Papua.

Ternyata pembangunan praktis tak dijalankan untuk warga Papua. Kekerasan mewarnai tahun-tahun pemerintahan Soeharto di Papua. Pada 1970an, rezim Soeharto memberlakukan policy represif terhadap Organisasi Papua Merdeka. Dia menunjuk perwira-perwira militer untuk memerintah Papua. Setiap kali ada protes dijawab dengan kekerasan.

Perusahaan-perusahaan internasional masuk dan melakukan eksplorasi alam dalam ukuran raksasa. Freeport McMoran, sebuah perusahaan New Orleans, membangun tambang emas paling besar dunia di Grasberg, Timika. Ironis, Freeport tanda tangan kontrak tambang dengan Indonesia pada 1967 ketika Papua masih belum resmi jadi wilayah Indonesia. Menurut data 2008 dari Nindja, sebuah NGO Tokyo, tiga perusahaan Jepang memegang 75 persen saham di kilang tembaga Gresik. Kebanyakan tembaga untuk Gresik berasal dari tambang Freeport di Papua. Mitsubishi Materials memiliki saham 60,5 persen, Nikko Metal 5 persen, dan Mitsubishi 9,5 persen. Sekitar 50 hingga 60 persen tembaga dari Grasberg diekspor ke Jepang. Menurut harian New York Times, Freeport jadi sapi perah operasi militer Indonesia di Papua. Freeport rutin sumbang dana untuk keperluan militer Indonesia di Papua.

Pada November 1983, militer Indonesia menangkap musikus Arnold Ap dari Universitas Cenderawasih di Port Numbay. Kesalahan Ap? Dia mengumpulkan dan merekam musik-musik dari berbagai etnik Papua, sekaligus dalam bahasa-bahasa asli mereka. Macam-macam lagu ini lantas diproduksi dan diedarkan lewat pasar bebas. Lagu-lagu ini dianggap membantu pembentukan nasionalisme Papua. Dia disekap dan dianiaya dalam sebuah bekas toko, yang dijadikan markas rahasia militer. Belakangan, militer serahkan Ap pada polisi.

Menurut dokumen pengadilan dan kesaksian seorang polisi Papua, pada malam 21 April 1984, seorang penjaga, Pius Wanem, membius dua polisi dan membuka kunci sel. Wanem, Arnold Ap dan empat tahanan lain, naik taksi pergi ke pantai Base-G di Port Numbay, menunggu kapal yang akan membawa mereka ke Papua New Guinea. Mereka menunggu di sebuah gua. Wanem sendiri kembali ke Port Numbay. Dia belakangan kembali ke pantai dengan beberapa tentara. Dalam persidangan, Pius Wanem mengatakan Arnold Ap dan seorang tahanan tewas dalam "operasi Kopassandha." Kopassandha singkatan dari Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha, sebuah pasukan khusus Indonesia. Arnold Ap mati ditembak di perut. Ini menciptakan ketakutan. Gelombang pengungsi ke PNG mulai lagi.

Pada Juni 1984, Menteri Luar Negeri Indonesia Mochtar Kusumaatmadja mengatakan dalam konferensi pers bahwa Ap dicegat di laut ketika kapal melarikan diri. Patroli minta mereka menyerah. Perahu Ap tiba-tiba menembaki kapal patroli, yang menyebabkan kapal patroli menembak balik, termasuk Arnold Ap. Kusumaatmadja menuduh Arnold Ap sebagai “separatis OPM.”

Okawa-san juga mengingatkan saya pada Teruko Wanggai, perempuan Jepang yang menikah dengan cendekiawan Papua Dr. Tom Wanggai di prefecture Okayama. Di Port Numbay, Dr. Wanggai memperkenalkan bendera pro-kemerdekaan “Melanesia Barat” pada 14 Desember 1988. Bendera ini berbeda dari bendera Bintang Kejora versi 1961. Wanggai juga memakai terminologi "Melanesia Barat." Dia meninggalkan Bintang Kejora dengan alasan bendera itu bikinan orang Belanda dengan tiga warna Belanda: biru, merah, putih. Orang Papua biasa sebut bendera Wanggai sebagai “Bintang 14” karena ada 14 bintang.

Belanda atau bukan, Wanggai ditangkap dan dihukum 20 tahun penjara. Pada 1995, saat ditahan dalam sel penjara Cipinang, Jakarta, dia mengeluh sakit. Namun dia tak segera diberi bantuan medis. Wanggai meninggal pada 12 Maret 1996 di rumah sakit Jakarta. Port Numbay dilanda protes besar ketika jenazah Wanggai tiba dari Jakarta.

Setelah Presiden Suharto mengundurkan diri pada Mei 1998, pemerintah Indonesia mengizinkan Timor Timur untuk bikin referendum. Pada Januari 1999, Presiden B.J. Habibie bilang lebih baik referendum sekarang daripada ditunda 10 tahun lagi. Sebulan berikutnya, 100 delegasi Papua datang ke Habibie, mereka juga minta diizinkan bikin referendum. Habibie menolak. Namun Habibie menjanjikan otonomi khusus kepada Papua –persis seperti janji Soeharto pada 1969.

Janji Habibie dijawab oleh Presiden Megawati Soekarnoputri. Megawati memberikan status daerah Otonomi Khusus kepada Papua pada Agustus 2001. Ia meliputi pelimpahan kekuasaan lebih besar secara politik dan keuangan bagi provinsi ini. Undang-undang Otonomi Khusus juga secara eksplisit mengizinkan simbol-simbol identitas Papua ditampilkan terbuka, seperti bendera dan lagu kebangsaan rakyat Papua. Ia juga mengizinkan pendirian Majelis Rakyat Papua, sebuah organisasi perwakilan penduduk asli Papua, yang merasa terpinggirkan dengan kedatangan migran Indonesia.

Namun salah seorang wakil Papua yang ikut “musyawarah” serta mendengar janji-janji Presiden Soeharto pada Agustus 1969, merasa perlu untuk menyatakan keraguan dia secara terbuka. Kali ini dia merasa perlu mendengar hati nurani dia. Nama politikus tersebut Theys Eluay. Dia mantan politikus binaan Soeharto dan kini ketua umum Presidium Dewan Papua, sebuah organisasi yang kuat. Eluay menolak program otonomi khusus dari Jakarta. Dia bilang Papua harus merdeka. Dia tak ingin Papua tertipu lagi. Dia ingin PBB memahami ketidakpercayaan bangsa Papua terhadap Indonesia.

“Kalau saya mati, saya pasti masuk ke surga. Tetapi kalau saya lihat orang Indonesia di sana, biar satu orang saja, saya akan lari tinggalkan surga. Kalau malaikat Tuhan tanya saya mengapa lari, nanti saya jawab, ‘Ah saya takut orang Indonesia menjajah kami orang Papua di surga juga,’” kata Theys Eluay.

Pada 10 November 2001, Komando Pasukan Khusus alias Kopassus, nama baru Kopassandha, mengundang Theys Eluay ikut perayaan Hari Pahlawan Indonesia, yang diadakan Kopassus di daerah Hamadi, Port Numbay. Ketika pulang, tujuh prajurit Kopassus mencegat, mencekik dan membunuh Theys Eluay. Sopirnya, Aristoteles Masoka, sempat telepon isteri Eluay, Yaneke Ohee, dan bilang Eluay diculik. Namun telepon tersebut singkat sekali. Mayat Eluay dan mobil Toyota Kijang dibuang di daerah Koya, luar kota Port Numbay.

Sehari sesudah pembunuhan, Lt. Kol. Hartomo, komandan Kopassus di Port Numbay, bikin press conference. Dia bilang Kopassus sama sekali tak terlibat dengan pembunuhan Eluay. Masoka sendiri hilang tak tentu rimba hingga hari ini. Namun tekanan dunia internasional memaksa kepolisian Indonesia melakukan penyelidikan. Pada April 2003, pengadilan di Surabaya menghukum tujuh prajurit Kopassus, termasuk Letnan Kolonel Hartomo, melakukan penganiayaan, yang berakibat kematian Eluay. Namun mereka tak terbukti melakukan pembunuhan. Hukuman penjara tujuh prajurit itu antara dua hingga 3,5 tahun penjara. Hartomo pingsan ketika mendengar dia dipecat dan dihukum penjara 3.5 tahun.

Namun Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat Jenderal Ryamizard Ryacudu memuji para terhukum sebagai ”pahlawan Indonesia” karena berhasil membunuh ”pemberontak”. Tak ada investigasi lebih lanjut untuk mengetahui siapa yang memerintahkan pembunuhan itu. Tak ada pejabat senior yang dituntut bertangungjawab. Masoka juga hilang tanpa ada upaya pencarian.

Pembunuhan ini secara dramatis meningkatkan ketegangan politik di Papua. Orang Papua makin meragukan otonomi khusus dimana dikatakan hak-hak asasi manusia akan dihargai. Bagaimana bisa percaya otonomi bila Theys Eluay dibunuh?

Pengganti Megawati, Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, menciptakan sebuah aturan dimana menaikkan bendera Bintang Kejora dinyatakan sebagai kegiatan terlarang lewat Peraturan Pemerintah nomor 77/2007. Aturan ini, menurut ketua Majelis Rakyat Papua Agus A. Alua, melanggar UU 21/2001 tentang Otonomi Khusus. Namun Yudhoyono diam saja.

Ironisnya, orang-orang Papua lantas mengetahui bahwa Hartomo, yang sudah dihukum penjara 3.5 tahun dan dipecat dari militer, ternyata naik pangkat menjadi kolonel. Hartomo bahkan menjadi komandan Group I Kopassus di Serang.

Sementara pengadilan Indonesia terus mengkriminalkan aktivis-aktivis Papua, termasuk Filep Karma, yang menyebarkan sentimen kemerdekaan, lewat pengibaran bendera. Indonesia melarang segala bentuk pengungkapan ekspresi damai di Papua.

Kami bertiga hanya bisa termenung dalam toko Graha Budaya Indonesia.

Ketika membaca Prosecuting Criminal Aspiration: Indonesia’s Political Prisoners, Seichi Okawa mengatakan kasihan begitu banyak orang Papua ditahan di berbagai penjara Indonesia. Dia melihat gambar Filep Karma. Ferdinand Pakage. Simon Tuturop. Buchtar Tabuni. Dia geleng-geleng kepala. Kami menghabiskan kopi Wamena. Pamitan.

Izumi Kurimoto dan saya meninggalkan kantor Okawa-san serta menuju stasiun Takadanobaba. Ketika jalan kaki, menelusuri jalan-jalan kecil, saya pikir, selama empat dekade terakhir, saya heran bahwa dukungan untuk merdeka tetap bertahan. Ketidakpercayaan orang Papua terhadap pemerintah Indonesia makin hari makin menyebar. Mungkin karena orang Papua kehilangan tanah-tanah adat bagi proyek-proyek pembangunan, dan gelombang para pendatang dari Indonesia, terutama Pulau Jawa, tetap jalan sesudah Presiden Soeharto mundur. Taktik umum yang dipakai para pendukung kemerdekaan, dengan sederhana menaikkan bendera Bintang Kejora dalam upacara terbuka, secara emosional memang matching dengan psikologi orang Papua. Saya tahu bahwa isu kemerdekaan bukan masalah hukum sederhana. Papua secara legal adalah sah milik negara Indonesia. Saya tak tahu hingga kapan perbedaan ini bertahan. Dan entah berapa banyak orang Papua lagi akan dikorbankan.

III

PADA 3 Mei 2010, Dzulkiflry Imadul Bilad, seorang mahasiswa Institut Teknologi Bandung, salah satu perguruan tinggi paling prestisius di Pulau Jawa, menumpahkan kemarahan tentang kekalahan klub sepakbola Persib Bandung terhadap Persipura Port Numbay dengan update Facebook: “Dasar orang Papua, bisanya tarkam, pake otot bukan pake otak maen bolanya, ga sekolah, bodo2 semua, udah item idup lai. Sialan lu Papua!”

Status itu menyulut reaksi. Yohanes Okdinon, seorang mahasiswa Papua di Bandung, menyebarkan kalimat Bilad, dalam jaringan Facebook. Bilad minta maaf, sehari kemudian, juga lewat status Facebook. Sedikitnya muncul 500 kecaman terhadap Bilad. Bahkan dua minggu kemudian, Ikatan Mahasiswa Papua Bandung bikin protes depan gedung ITB. Sekitar 100 mahasiswa Papua minta ITB memberhentikan Bilad. Poster mereka berbunyi:
  • “Rasisme Terhadap Orang Papua=Melanggar HAM orang Papua”
  • “Tidak Ada Perbedaan Diantara Kita, Kita Satu RI”
  • “Selama Anak-Anak Kandung Pertiwi Masih Rasis, Selama Itu Pula Bumi Pertiwi Indonesia Berjalan di Tempat”.
Komentar Yohanes Okdinon muncul di media. “Sebenarnya kita menyesalkan kenapa pernyataan rasis seperti itu bisa keluar dari mahasiswa universitas ternama,” kata Okdinon.

ITB memang salah satu perguruan tinggi paling utama di Indonesia. Ia menghasilkan banyak menteri, pengusaha, insinyur, politisi dan sebagainya. Alumnus ITB paling terkenal adalah Presiden Soekarno, seorang insinyur teknik sipil, yang lulus dari ITB ketika masih zaman Belanda. Namun presiden Keluarga Mahasiswa ITB Herry Dharmawan menolak tuduhan Okdinon. Dia bilang Zulfikry Imadul Bilad murni kesalahan pribadi. Ia tak mencerminkan ITB.

Okdinon mengatakan kasus Bilad menunjukkan sistem pendidikan di Indonesia gagal mendidik murid untuk tak rasialis terhadap orang Papua. Rektor ITB Akhmaloka memutuskan sanksi skors tiga semester dan kerja sosial pada Zulfikry Bilad.

Dzulkiflry Imadul Bilad, tentu saja, bukan satu-satunya kasus rasialisme terhadap Papua lewat Facebook. Pada 9 September 2010, empat bulan sesudah kasus Bandung, seorang mahasiswi Universitas Indonesia, Chey Nahumury, menulis:
"Orang negro dgn papua busuk tuh,,, beda kawan!!!!!!!!!!!! klo dorang wangi, kam tuh kulit bau, apalagi ketiak, coba... ko buktikan sekarang ko cium ko pu ketiak pasti bau tra enak."
Nahumury seorang mahasiswa Ambon, lulusan sekolah menengah di Abepura, Papua. Universitas Indonesia juga termasuk perguruan tinggi paling prestisius di Pulau Jawa. Ia cukup mengundang keramaian dalam Facebook. Nahumury segera mengganti nama account dia. Masalah ini tak mengundang protes sebesar ITB.

Saya pribadi tak heran bahwa ada mahasiswa-mahasiswa dari perguruan tinggi terkemuka di Indonesia yang berpandangan rasialis terhadap manusia Papua. Ia sama dengan rasialisme terhadap orang kulit hitam di Amerika Serikat. Rasialisme Papua hal umum di Indonesia. Mereka dihina sebagai orang hitam, orang bodoh, orang bau dan orang kasar. 

Pada 1994, Dr. George J. Aditjondro, seorang cendekiawan Indonesia, menulis berbagai kasus rasialisme Papua, dalam sebuah paper, “Menerapkan Kerangka Analisis Frantz Fanon terhadap Pemikiran tentang Pembangunan Irian Jaya.” Aditjondro menggunakan argumentasi Fanon, pemikir Aljazair, yang bikin pengamatan di Aljazair dan Afrika Selatan, soal warna kulit, kolonialisme dan rasialisme. Rasialisme ini mensyaratkan kebudayaan si penjajah lebih tinggi dari kebudayaan si kulit hitam. Fanon mengatakan bahwa kolonialisme selalu disertai rasialisme.

Saya kira penjelasan ini penting untuk menerangkan bagaimana mayoritas orang Indonesia melihat Papua. Status Facebook Zulfikry Bilad dan Chey Nahumury mencerminkan superioritas Indonesia terhadap Papua. Ia mencerminkan rasialisme yang typical dari orang Indonesia terhadap orang Papua. Ia juga menerangkan mengapa rasialisme ini penting ketika Indonesia mengirim ratusan ribu migran ke Papua, termasuk orang tua Chey Nahumury, guna mendirikan koloni-koloni Indonesia di Papua. Ini sama dengan kolonialisme Eropa di Aljazair dan Afrika Selatan.

Heni Lani, mahasiswa Papua di Bandung, mengatakan, “Secara pribadi, saya melihat, mengalami, merasakan dan menyadari bagaimana orang Papua terus dipecah-belah dan dipermainkan dengan berbagai cara. Misalnya kebijakan pemekaran, dana ototonomi khusus, 'perang suku', istilah gunung-pantai dan lain-lain. Sa yakin, sodara-sodara yang lain juga mengalami hal yang sama.”

Rasialisme ini umum terjadi di media Indonesia. Dr. Aditjondro menulis, “Betapa populernya penggambaran tentang orang Dani sebagai ‘orang-orang yang nyaris telanjang, yang masih hidup di zaman batu,’ tanpa menyadari bahwa para petani di Lembah Balim, misalnya, memiliki budaya pertanian ubi-ubian yang tergolong paling canggih di dunia, hasil inovasi dan adaptasi selama 400 tahun tanpa bantuan sepotong logam.” 

Di Facebook milik “kawan-kawan” saya, ada saja gambar orang Papua pakai koteka sambil pakai mobile phone. Ada koteka orang Dani dipasangi antena telepon. Ada gambar perempuan Dani, dada telanjang, lagi mengetik laptop.

Dalam film dokumenter Strange Birds in Paradise karya Charlie Hill-Smith, Prof. Arief Budiman, seorang cendekiawan Indonesia di Melbourne University, mengatakan bahwa orang Papua masih “primitif” dan memerlukan “teknologi dari Jawa.” Makin lengkaplah pandangan merendahkan orang Papua, dari mahasiswa macam Bilad hingga profesor Arief Budiman.

Pada September 2010, secara acak saya google dua frasa: Metro TV dan "perang suku." Metro TV adalah salah satu televisi terkemuka di Jakarta dengan siaran seluruh Indonesia. Hasilnya, dalam waktu 0.25 detik, saya dapatkan 3,260 referensi terhadap dua frasa itu.

Misalnya dengan berita berjudul, “Perang Suku di Kwamki Lama Kembali Pecah” pada 13 Mei 2010:

Metrotvnews.com, Timika: Perang antarkubu kembali pecah di Kwamki Lama, Timika, Papua, Kamis (13/5) siang. Dua orang terluka dan dilarikan ke Rumah Sakit Mitra Masyarakat Timika.

Keributan terjadi antara warga Mambruk dengan warga Tunikama. Dua kelompok berseteru setelah warga Mambruk menyerang lawannya. Kejadian berlangsung di hutan sejak pagi hingga siang. Kedua kubu sepakat tidak ribut di jalan raya.
Padahal keributan terjadi antara dua kelompok, warga Mambruk dan warga Tunikama, di kampung Kwamki Lama. Metro TV tak sebut bahwa ketika Freeport mulai bikin penambangan, mereka menggusur kampung-kampung asli Papua, serta menempatkan orang dari macam-macam kampung tersebut di Kwamki Lama. Wajar bila sesekali terjadi salah paham di daerah Kwamki Lama. Ia bukan masyarakat tradisional. Ia sudah masyarakat urban dengan macam-macam warga dari macam-macam daerah. Metro TV menggambarkan “Kwamki Lama” seakan-akan ia cermin Papua.

Heni Lani mengatakan bila ada keributan serupa di Jawa atau Sumatra, media pakai istilah “kriminalitas” atau “perkelahian antar gang.” Namun bila terjadi di Papua, media memberitakan sebagai “perang suku.” Kesannya, orang Papua terbelakang, masih perang antar suku dan bodoh. Pemberitaan ini merendahkan orang Papua. Ia tak beda dengan status Bilad dan Nahumury. Ia membenarkan sikap pemerintah Indonesia untuk melakukan “pendidikan yang keras” terhadap orang hitam, orang bodoh, orang kasar dan bau.

Kontributor Metro TV di Timika Alfian Pakadang mengatakan pada saya, “Itu kesalahan redaksi. Saya tidak memakai istilah perang suku. Saya pakai istilah ‘bentrokan antar kelompok’ atau ‘antar warga.’” Ini ketidaktahuan mereka. Saya selalu jelaskan bahwa ini tidak jauh beda dengan tawuran-tawuran di mana-mana. Ini bukan perang suku. Ini gabungan-gabungan orang.” Pakadang bilang terminologi “perang suku” adalah istilah yang rasialis. Dia tak mengerti mengapa redaksi Metro TV di Jakarta selalu pakai terminologi “perang suku.”

Contoh lain adalah buku terbitan Kopassus pada Desember 2009 berjudul Kopassus untuk Indonesia karangan Iwan Santosa dan E.A. Natanegara. Ia menggambarkan Kopassus sebagai sebuah organisasi yang sudah berubah, sudah belajar hormat hak asasi manusia. Ia juga menyesal Kopassus terlibat dalam penculikan mahasiswa pada zaman Presiden Soeharto. Ia juga cerita bahwa sekitar 1,000 dari 5,000 prajurit Kopassus ditugaskan di Papua … dan mereka sudah bisa bicara dialek Papua. Namun ada satu kasus besar sama sekali tak disebut buku tersebut: Theys Eluay. Ia mengesankan bahwa pembunuhan Eluay tidak penting. Ia mengesankan tak ada penyesalan dari Kopassus terhadap pembunuhan Theys Eluay. Buku tersebut terbitan Red & White Publishing, sebuah perusahaan Jakarta, yang diberi mandat oleh komandan Kopassus Mayor Jenderal Pramono Edhie Wibowo. Saya wawancara Iwan Santosa, seorang wartawan Kompas, namun dia menolak keterangan dia saya kutip.

Lengkaplah sudah. Dari mahasiswa hingga profesor, dari wartawan hingga tentara. Saya kuatir Frantz Fanon perlu sedikit revisi analisis dia. Rasialisme-cum-kolonialisme bukan saja terjadi antara orang kulit putih dan kulit hitam. Tapi juga kulit coklat terhadap hitam.

Benarlah argumentasi Ernest Renan, pemikir nasionalisme dari Brittany, Prancis, bahwa jangan karena warna kulit sama, atau hampir sama, maka ia sekaligus jaminan mereka satu “bangsa.” Kolonialisme dengan beda sedikit warna kulit lebih sulit dimengerti daripada kolonialisme kulit putih terhadap kulit hitam. Nasionalisme Indonesia sudah gagal ketika ia membiarkan rasialisme tumbuh dari kelompok mayoritas terhadap kelompok minoritas --sesama kelompok masyarakat dalam negara Indonesia. Nasionalisme sebaiknya tak didasarkan pada kesamaan warna kulit … namun kesamaan nasib dan kesamaan cita-cita.

IV

PADA 17 Agustus 2009, ketika hendak berkunjung ke penjara Cipinang di Jakarta, tiba-tiba saya dapat pesan dari Filep Karma. Suara lirih. Dia bilang dia kesakitan, nyaris tak bisa kencing selama lima hari. Tampaknya, ada sesuatu yang tidak beres dengan saluran kencing dia.

Saya tanya apakah sudah minta izin berobat? Karma mengatakan kepala sipir penjara Anthonius Ayorbaba memerintahkan Karma dibawa ke klinik penjara. Perawat klinik cuma menganjurkan Karma minum banyak air dan tiduran dengan kaki diangkat. Saya kecewa sekali. Saya tahu narapidana berhak mendapat perawatan dalam penjara. Untungnya, hari itu, ada seorang wartawan Bintang Papua Hendrik Yance Udam memotret Karma dengan kaki diangkat dalam sel yang berantakan. Keesokan hari, gambar tersebut diterbitkan Bintang Papua dan Ayorbaba terpaksa setuju membawa Karma ke rumah sakit Dok Dua, Port Numbay.

Dokter Dok Dua mengobati Karma beberapa waktu antara Agustus dan Oktober 2009. Dalam sebuah surat bertanggal 5 Oktober 2009, Dr. Mauritz Okosera dan Jhon Sambara, masing-masing kepala unit pemindahan pasien dan kepala administrasi rumah sakit Dok Dua, menulis kepada PT Asuransi Kesehatan Indonesia, sebuah perusahaan asuransi, menyatakan bahwa pasien Filep Karma harus dibawa ke Rumah Sakit PGI Cikini di Jakarta guna operasi urologi. Pada 11 November 2009, Dr. Donald Arronggear dari rumah sakit Dok Dua memerinci hasil tes medis Karma yang dilakukan di rumah sakit selama dua bulan. Dia merekomendasikan Karma secepatnya dibawa ke unit pengobatan urologi modern di Jakarta.

Karma membuat surat, minta kepada Ayorbaba agar bisa dibawa ke Jakarta guna menjalani operasi. Ayorbaba mengatakan kepada anggota keluarga Karma bahwa dia tak punya wewenang memerintahkan pemindahan semacam ini. Dia juga menambahkan pemerintah Indonesia tak punya uang guna mengobati Karma ke Jakarta.

Ayorbaba mengatakan agar Karma minta izin pemindahan ke Nazarudin Bunas, kepala Departemen Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia di Port Numbay. Pendek kata, selama beberapa bulan, Filep Karma dipingpong dari sana ke sini, dari sini ke sana. Uang selalu jadi masalah.

Sekelompok aktivis dari Solidaritas Korban Pelanggaran HAM Papua mulai menggalang dukungan pada 8 Maret 2010. SKPHP minta sumbangan terbuka di jalan-jalan, guna membantu pengobatan Filep Karma dan Ferdinand Pakage. Mereka mengumpulkan Rp 25 juta dalam dua hari pertama penggalangan dana. Mereka bilang sumbangan paling banyak berupa pecahan uang Rp 100 ribu. Ada juga kawan lama Karma sumbang Rp 40 juta. Namun Departemen Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia serta Ayorbaba tetap menolak untuk proses izin berobat itu.

Pada awal Mei 2010, pemerintah Indonesia mengirim kepala penjara baru, Liberty Sitinjak, menggantikan Ayorbaba sebagai kepala penjara Abepura. Sitinjak terkaget-kaget ketika tahu bahwa tak ada berkas Filep Karma dalam file peninggalan Ayorbaba. Pergantian ini, dari Ayorbaba, yang orang Papua, kepada Sitinjak, yang orang Batak, membuka jalan untuk pengobatan Filep Karma ke Jakarta. Sitinjak mengurus prosedur pengobatan. Ayorbaba meradang dan menolak dipindah ke Sumatra.

Karma sendiri menolak berangkat ke Jakarta bila Ferdinand Pakage tak ikut diberangkatkan. Dia bilang Pakage sakit lebih lama daripada dia. Beberapa aktivis dan keluarga Pakage membujuk Karma berangkat lebih dulu karena dia sudah lebih berumur daripada Pakage. Ferdinand Pakage juga perlu diperiksa lebih dulu di rumah sakit Dok Dua. Akhirnya, Karma bersedia berangkat ke Jakarta.

Tokoh Papua Filep Karma menjalani perawatan prostate di rumah sakit PGI Cikini, Jakarta, selama 11 hari. Seorang perawat mengecek tekanan darah Karma sesudah operasi. ©2010 Ricky Dajoh

Saya ikut menyambut kedatangan Filep Karma di airport Jakarta pada 19 Juli 2010. Dia datang bersama ibunya, Eklefina Noriwari, seorang paman, seorang sepupu, asisten dan asisten Karma, Cyntia Warwe, serta dua petugas penjara Abepura dan polisi Port Numbay. Serah terima dari petugas Abepura kepada petugas penjara Cipinang, yang secara resmi mengampu Karma selama di Jakarta, dilakukan langsung di rumah sakit Cikini.

Dokter David Manuputty, seorang spesialis urologi, yang sudah bikin pencangkokan ginjal lebih dari 400 kali, langsung melakukan pemeriksaan di Cikini. Karma dapat cek darah, tekanan jantung, rontgen, CT Scan, USG dan sebagainya. Menurut Cyntia Warwe, dokter Manuputty mengatakan Karma ternyata diet dengan ketat, selalu minum air dan tak makan daging merah (hanya ikan). Diet ini menyelamatkan nyawa Karma. Biasanya orang dengan prostate acute sudah stroke. Manuputty mulanya kuatir prostate ini sudah mempengaruhi ginjal.

Pada 22 Juli, Manuputty melakukan bedah laser prostate selama dua jam. Manuputty tak pakai pisau bedah. Dia memasukkan sebuah alat ke dalam prostate Karma. Ada benjolan daging dalam prostate, yang menutup saluran kencing, dipotong dan dibelah-belah lewat bantuan kamera kecil dan laser. Dia perlu tiga hari lagi untuk recovery. Kencing masih berdarah dan keluar potongan daging lewat saluran kencing. Karma sempat minta seseorang menunjukkan foto prostate kepada saya.

Empat hari kemudian, Manuputty menyatakan operasi berjalan lancar dan berhasil. Air kencing Karma sudah jernih. Dari hasil rontgen, dokter juga menemukan bekas patah tulang tetapi sudah sembuh walau tak sempurna, tampaknya dampak dari Karma terjatuh di penjara Abepura. Operasi prostate selesai. Namun, rombongan perlu empat hari lagi menunggu penerbangan pulang sekaligus mengurus pengawalan dari pihak Cipinang. Beberapa kawan lama dia datang bezoek ke rumah sakit. Saya juga datang membawa makanan dan bacaan. Karma terlihat gembira. Dia sering tertawa dan bergurau.

Dia mengatakan pada saya jumlah orang asli Papua terancam dengan kedatangan jumlah migran Indonesia, secara besar-besaran, sehingga kebudayaan Melanesia tertekan oleh kebudayaan migran. Dia bilang pada sensus 1971, jumlah penduduk asli Papua sekitar 900 ribu dari total hampir sejuta orang. Orang Papua sekitar 90 persen. Kini jumlah tersebut kurang dari 50 persen dari lebih 3 juta warga total Papua. Dia bilang orang Papua menerima migran. Namun tidak dalam jumlah dan dominasi sebesar sekarang (Sensus 2010 mengatakan total warga Papua 3.9 juta dan penduduk asli diperkirakan 49 persen. Papua adalah daerah dengan pertumbuhan penduduk paling tinggi di seluruh Indonesia).

Dia bilang dia ingin kelak, bila Papua jadi negara berdaulat, ia juga tetap terbuka terhadap para migran Indonesia, yang sudah lahir dan hidup di Papua. Perjuangan dia bukan perjuangan yang rasialis. Dia tunjukkan pada saya beberapa kawan sekolah dia, ada orang Minahasa, Batak maupun Jawa, bezoek ke rumah sakit. Dia juga sadar betapa banyak politikus Papua baku hantam, besar ego dan selalu berebut cari nama.

“Saya pernah bilang pada anak-anak Parlemen Jalanan. Bila Papua merdeka, saya ingin nama saya dihapus dari sejarah perjuangan bangsa Papua. Biar anak saya atau cucu saya tidak manfaatkan nama bapa atau opa mereka untuk cari jabatan atau penghargaan. Saya sedia mati demi rakyat Papua. Bukan cari jabatan. Bukan cari nama,” katanya.

Audryne, putri sulung Karma, mengatakan pada saya, "Satu pesan Bapa yg selalu saya ingat, "Lebih baik jadi berguna daripada jadi hebat. Hebat belum tentu ko bisa bantu banyak orang. Dan ingat selalu bersyukur sama Tuhan."’

Penjagaan di rumah sakit, tentu saja, cukup ketat. Selain dijaga dua petugas Cipinang, Filep Karma juga dijaga polisi Jakarta Pusat serta Badan Intelijen Negara. Keluarga Karma, termasuk Audryne dan adikknya, Andrefina, juga menjaga dengan bantuan mahasiswa Papua di Jakarta. Mereka berdua kuliah di Bandung. Filep Karma kembali ke penjara Abepura pada 30 Juli 2010.

Saya senang Filep Karma dapat pelayanan bermutu di Jakarta. Dia lega karena dia diperlakukan beda dari Dr. Tom Wanggai. Namun Karma hanya satu dari banyak orang Papua yang jadi korban pelanggaran oleh Indonesia. Dan Karma juga masih tetap berada di penjara hingga tahun 2019. Dia konsisten menolak remisi karena secara tersirat ia berarti dia mengakui dia bersalah. Karma memang tidak bersalah. Dia dipenjara secara tidak adil. Saya kira perlu lebih banyak lagi kampanye dan kerja untuk mendesak pemerintah Indonesia membebaskan tapol macam Filep Karma. Dan tentu perlu ada perbaikan cara berpikir di Indonesia dalam memandang Papua.

Jakarta, November 2010

Paper ini dipresentasikan di konferensi internasional tentang Comprehending West Papua di University of Sydney pada 23-24 Februari 2011.


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